“We need to provide support, but let the people lead their own processes of change”
Dr. Mariam Salehi, political scientist at Freie Universität Berlin, on the protests in Iran, comparable uprisings, and how we can do our part from afar
Nov 04, 2022
Mariam Salehi investigates how political, social, economic, and legal factors play a role in transnational conflicts. In doing so, the political scientist hopes to identify the consequences these have for resolving such conflicts.
Image Credit: Marion Kuka
Ever since the brutal death of Jina Mahsa Amini at the hands of police on September 16, 2022, Iran has been rocked by mass protests. Where does the anger fueling these protests come from? Is the forced wearing of the hijab really the issue here? And what possibilities does the Iranian regime have to pacify those protesting; what legitimacy can it still claim? An interview with social scientist Mariam Salehi, leader of the junior research group “Transnational Conflicts” at the INTERACT Center for Interdisciplinary Peace and Conflict Research at Freie Universität Berlin.
Dr. Salehi, how would you define the situation that has unfolded in Iran over the past weeks: Are we looking at an uprising? A revolution? A protest movement?
I would say that we are dealing with an uprising – a revolutionary process. We can’t yet say where this will lead, or how far it will go. However, it is more than just a series of protests. This is clear from what the protesters are trying to achieve, namely the end of the status quo. They want to completely change the current state of affairs. The people aren’t taking issue with one single policy or political decision.
Where does the anger fueling these protests come from? There appear to be multiple uprisings taking place at the same time: those occurring in Kurdish areas and Baluchistan, and those in Tehran, where it seems to be the middle class taking to the streets, and the protests are primarily centered around the issue of forcing women to wear the hijab. What’s your take on the situation?
I don’t know if I would say that the protests in Tehran are primarily centered around forcing women to wear the hijab. The hijab is more of a symbol; forcing women to wear one is symptomatic of larger political transgressions.
Are Westerners concentrating so heavily on the hijab because it is such a controversial issue within our own societies? It seems to be a very appropriate symbol because it is a physical manifestation of repression through politics.
Yes, of course, the hijab carries great symbolic significance. It is something visible, tangible. However, the debate isn’t about the hijab itself. The hijab is understood as an expression of political repression …
… and we tend to see women more as victims of this repression than men because of the hijab?
Exactly. But men are also affected when women lack political freedom.
Does this mean that men are just as unfree as women – it’s just not immediately obvious from their appearance?
Yes. Returning to your question about who is actually taking to the streets in Iran to protest the political regime, we are seeing that the political system has actually managed to alienate many different groups of society. The protests aren’t only about forcing women to wear the hijab, nor are they only about the discrimination of minorities. This anger is being fueled by the interplay of political and socioeconomic grievances at work in Iran. Protesters are taking issue with their lack of political rights and with the country’s economic problems.
How much legitimacy can the regime still claim? This will be a deciding factor in how much violence it will have to use to put a stop to the uprisings.
That’s difficult to say. On the one hand, we are seeing security forces take brutal action against protesters; however, on the other hand, they seem to have missed the moment at which they could have suppressed the uprising had they applied enough force.
The more illegitimate the regime, the greater the amount of violence that needs to be implemented to maintain it. At the same time, the use of violence also serves to undermine any sense of legitimacy. This is something that played a big role in the Tunisian revolution. There, the brutal response at the beginning of the uprisings only served to alienate many in the middle class who were maybe dissatisfied but not as heavily affected by political marginalization and state-sanctioned violence.
Is it possible that the government will be able to appease people by making concessions? For example, if they were to abolish the morality police?
I don’t think that that would be enough. And if so, it would be too late. This is something we have seen with other revolutionary events of recent years. When faced with a lack of options, regimes often attempt to make concessions after already having lost momentum.
It is possible that these concessions might have satisfied someone a few weeks ago – but not anymore. This is also due to the fact that, in cases like these, there is no single source of dissatisfaction, but rather many – and on multiple levels. This means that there is no quick fix.
What kind of meaningful support can we provide those protesting in Iran? Can we even provide support?
That’s a difficult question to answer. After all, the Iranian regime is claiming that these protests are all being controlled by foreign instigators, which simply cannot be the case. However, it is very important to have the possibility to exchange views and information, not only for the people in Iran itself, but also for the outside world.
We are dealing with a movement that began and is centered in Iran, but which has implications that go beyond national borders – this is a movement where it is important that those who are not directly affected also show solidarity. International attention and solidarity can, to a certain extent, help protect people.
But with regard to another transnational aspect: In other contexts, I have also worked on the “justice industry” of professionals who are always ready and waiting to get involved in promoting democracy after the overthrow of a regime and to contribute knowledge and resources toward efforts of “state building” or “transitional justice.” It’s important to maintain a balance: provide support, but let the people lead their own processes of change. And not dictate what a future state should look like.
What could a process of change look like for Iran? What options does a regime like this have? Or can these problems only be resolved with a clean break, for example, with a constitutional assembly that starts completely from scratch?
An overthrow of the regime – we’re not at this point yet in Iran, but the day may come – opens the door to profound changes. However, at the same time, it’s impossible to wipe the slate clean in cases like this. You can’t simply start from scratch because you always need some kind of institution or reference to build on. It is impossible to predict how the situation in Iran will continue to develop.
During revolutions, there is also the risk that external forces will attempt to use the situation for their personal benefit. What about the Iranians living in exile who are still loyal to the shah?
The son of the shah recently claimed that he has no intention of returning to Iran, nor does he have any pretensions to power. However, there will of course be monarchists out there. For example, it was possible to make out some Pahlavi sympathizers at Berlin’s demonstration held in solidarity with those in Iran.
I would say that differences such as these are currently taking a back seat; people with different views are uniting to collectively reject the current circumstances in Iran. If the regime is overthrown, however, there will be many political struggles and disputes to come. That’s politics.
Pepe Egger conducted the interview.
This article originally appeared in German on October 31, 2022, in campus.leben, the online magazine of Freie Universität Berlin.