At universities, controversies over academic freedom often flare up around the invitation or disinvitation of politically prominent speakers. For a start, it is important to keep in mind the different roles of the actors involved: the decision to invite someone to an academic event is made by the hosting scholars, based on their own freedom in research and teaching. University administrations do not need to be consulted and do not have to give approval. Ministries have no authority to issue directives regarding the lineup of events. However, in cases where serious disruptions are anticipated, rescheduling an event may be necessary to ensure its safe execution. This is where university leadership becomes relevant. It goes without saying that security concerns must not be used as a mere pretext.

Political and civil society actors are free to criticize such invitations—also in harsh terms. It is not an infringement on academic freedom, for example, to express the opinion: “It is intolerable that a platform is being given to an antisemite.” Calls for disinvitation can themselves be criticized and must accept scrutiny regarding their political motivations. According to a famous argument by the philosopher John Stuart Mill, dissent and diversity of opinion are generally conducive to knowledge. For that reason alone, particularly strong arguments are needed to deny others access to public discourse that one claims for oneself.

From the perspective of scholars organizing an event, the issue is not a legal one: they already know that they are allowed to invite whomever they deem appropriate. The question they ask is whom they should or should not invite, and what considerations should guide them in doing so. Not everything that is legally permitted is also good academic practice.

In our view, the key consideration stems from the university’s core mission: universities’ mission is to conduct science—that is, methodically controlled, open-ended, and fallible inquiry. This pursuit requires certain virtues and is hindered by certain vices. These are, to be clear, not moral but epistemic virtues and vices. Certain attitudes, dispositions, and behaviors support the pursuit of open-ended inquiry; others hinder it. This is the subject of study in virtue epistemology.

Examples include: individuals who ignore presented evidence, consistently evade questions, twist others’ words, change the topic under pressure, or try to immunize their own views against criticism. Such behaviors demonstrate that the person is not engaged in a debate aimed at clarification or knowledge. These behaviors and vices can be summarized under the term intellectual dishonesty. Wherever such behavior may belong, it is detrimental to open-ended inquiry.

In our view, a person does not disqualify themselves from being invited to speak at a university by holding certain substantive views, nor by causing real or perceived discomfort to listeners. The university does not exist to safeguard orthodoxy or moral virtue, but rather its own DNA: the minimum standard of intellectual honesty essential to the pursuit of knowledge. Anyone who sabotages that pursuit through their epistemic and discursive conduct effectively removes themselves from the playing field.