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Academic Freedom in the Face of Tensions between Science and Morality

Stefan Gosepath, Professor of Philosophy, Freie Universität Berlin

Apr 09, 2025

Prof. Dr. Stefan Gosepath

Prof. Dr. Stefan Gosepath
Image Credit: Martin Funck

The German constitution protects academic freedom as a specific right, distinct from the right to freedom of expression. Freedom of research and teaching is of central importance for academic inquiry worthy of the name. Without freedom from external influence, academic research is unable or close to unable to achieve its own specific goal, which is the discovery of significant truths. When science is instrumentalized so as to reflect or confirm political, ideological, religious, or other popular views (let alone unfounded or false ones), this runs counter to its intrinsic aims.

Of course, there are limits to the freedom of science. Above all, the research in question must actually be aiming at finding the truth. In addition, other fundamental rights must be taken into account, as well as moral considerations and questions of justice. This often raises the big question whether it is right to prioritize moral judgment over science in the first place. When it comes to the means employed by scientific inquiry, the consensus seems to be that it is. The worthy end, i.e., to discover the truth, does not justify any and all means, especially when the means violate moral rights. By contrast, when it comes to the ends pursued by science, it is controversial whether there could ever be moral reasons to reject scientifically established propositions. Truth and morality might either be viewed as being completely separate, or there might be a precarious balance between these two different values. However, it seems more plausible to think of the aims of science, i.e., truth and knowledge, as being embedded within a larger web of normative goals, including equal respect and recognition of the moral (human) rights of all. If science demands to be free from outside interference, it must face up to its social responsibility and consider both epistemic and practical reasons when justifying its claims, without neglecting the distinctions between them. This can generate tensions of the kind often witnessed today, for instance, in the context of debates about gender identities. These tensions can only be resolved through dialogue – by a social discourse between science and the general public.

Further Information

Website Prof. Dr. Stefan Gosepath