A functioning democracy presupposes a shared commitment to reality – yet the state cannot legitimately assume the role of final arbiter in matters of truth. Fundamental rights, with academic freedom foremost among them, serve as indispensable safeguards for both the pursuit of truth and its preservation from ideological encroachment.

1. What Is Truth?

The scene described in the eighteenth chapter of St. John’s Gospel is, according to constitutional theorist Hans Kelsen, amongst the greatest in world literature. Jesus stands accused of political sedition before Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor in Jerusalem. When the accused declares that he came into the world as a king to bear witness to the truth, Pilate responds with a counter-question that has since become proverbial: “What is truth?” The sting of the story, however, lies in his turning to the crowd and holding a vote, which, as we know, ends unfavorably for Jesus, as the majority demand the release of Barabbas, reputedly a bandit. In other words, the entire episode serves as a lesson in populism. Whilst one may readily concede that truth cannot be determined by ballot, the question remains as to what this means for democracy and its relationship with truth.

But does the concern for truth equate to Pilate’s question? This is already either the product of a skeptical disposition or, as it appears, an expression of cowardice in the face of decision-making – ultimately merely a platitude in the cynical game of power. Be that as it may, the question of what truth is always arises when our understanding of truth has already become problematic. What meaning do we attribute to truth, and what stake do we have in it? Put differently, why should there be truth at all? The fundamental question about truth arises primarily from basic and existential needs, because we have a vital interest in discovering what we can reliably know about ourselves and the world. A preliminary answer, therefore, is this: those who enquire about truth are concerned with engaging realistically with the world in order to orient themselves within the reality of their lives. What is at stake, then, is the efficacy of truth: that which is reliably known to us, and therefore familiar, is true.

Yet only that which is reliable because it is valid can be true! For those who pose Pilate’s question, reliability and validity have diverged. Questions about the validity of what ought to be reliable thus become central to disputes over truth. For it is evident that only proof of truth’s validity can guarantee its reliability. Only then are we prepared to depend upon something, precisely because it is valid. What is true is determined by the grounds upon which we can justify our knowledge of truth.

The concern for truth therefore constitutes a fundamental orientation toward the value of knowledge: knowledge is preferable to ignorance. But why should there be knowledge at all, and why do we seek it? The answer can only be that we are drawn to knowledge’s liberating capacity. In other words: truth should exist for the sake of freedom! We can lead self-determined lives only if we are able to orient ourselves within reality. To achieve this, however, we require the assurance that our knowledge does not deceive us. For it is knowledge that establishes our connection to reality, rendering it concrete and verifiable. Valid knowledge is the prerequisite for a true orientation in the world and in life. Truth, then, is the foundation for our reliable orientation in the world. Because truth should serve freedom, we place knowledge in the service of enlightenment and emancipation.

2. Truth in Liberal Democracy

Against this backdrop, we may make an initial observation regarding the significance of truth for liberal democracy. In essence, it is an order of freedom that seeks to create space for diverse worldviews and pluralistic interests. It also promises that people need not live under external domination, but may help shape their living conditions through political participation. This requires, however, that all citizens agree – for the sake of their equal freedom – upon the kind of world they wish to inhabit together. Democracy needs a shared reference to reality that provides information about the natural and social conditions in which we live and which we must shape. This concerns not, of course, conformist opinions, but rather shared foundational assumptions about what is considered factual, which sources are trustworthy, and how evidence is evaluated. Particularly when the foundations of what is deemed “real” are contested, democratic decision-making must rely upon the force of argument and the willingness to weigh competing claims in processes of deliberation and resolution. Because the reliability of our knowledge about reality is both an individual and a collective good, democracy structures such processes of understanding so as to enable free agreement upon society’s body of knowledge.

However, since democracy thrives on the discourse of differing convictions, a state-imposed definition of “truth” would stifle democratic debate. Consequently, the state must not assume the role of arbiter of truth and decree what is true. The constitutional order of liberal democracy does not establish an order of truth, but an order of freedom. For freedom’s sake, it must confine itself to protecting the social spaces of communication within which disputes over truth are conducted. It is essential, however, that the state protects the freedom to seek truth without being able to enforce particular truth claims with the force of law. Article 5 of Germany’s Basic Law therefore encompasses the fundamental rights intended to enable and protect the search for truth: freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of information – and academic freedom.

3. Academic Freedom and Its Pursuit of Truth as an Interest of Liberal Democracy

When a verse from the eighth chapter of St. John’s Gospel is emblazoned in golden letters above the entrance portal of the University of Freiburg as a motto, it carries a meaning that is primarily secular: “The truth shall make you free!” Even if such rhetoric sounds antiquated to contemporary ears, the search for and pursuit of truth remains amongst the essential tasks of a university. This relates to the fact that in modern societies, the exploration of their world should proceed scientifically. This insight may be derived from the initial reflections on the fundamental understanding of truth in its dialectic of reliability and validity of our knowledge of reality. Science, which is primarily pursued at universities, assumes the function of a socially recognized authority for interpreting reality because it provides methodologically controlled and intersubjectively verifiable knowledge. In this manner, it meets the requirements of rational justifiability and verifiable knowledge which underpin socially shared true knowledge. This is also the position of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which, in its observations on academic freedom, defines it as the “earnest and methodical pursuit of truth in both content and form” (BVerfGE 35, 79 [113]).

Viewed thus, the fundamental right to academic freedom protects the university as a site of truth-seeking and institutionally safeguards its independence. Such autonomy is of paramount importance for liberal democracy. On the one hand, civil societies cannot dispense with knowledge of truth for the reasons outlined above. On the other hand, however, the state is unavailable as an authority for the possession of truth. Consequently, liberal democracy depends upon the methodically controlled and open-ended process of seeking truth being guaranteed at constitutional level: academic freedom must be secured if there is to be freedom in our society!