



Mark Juergensmayer

Why Guys Throw Bombs

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Nothing is more intimate than sexuality, and no greater humiliation can be experienced than failure over what one perceives to be one's sexual role. Such failures are often the bases of domestic violence; and when these failures are linked with the social roles of masculinity and femininity, they can lead to public violence. Terrorist acts, then, can be forms of symbolic empowerment for men whose traditional sexual roles—their very manhood—is perceived to be at stake.

Before we rush into an analysis of terrorism as a man's occupation, however, we have to acknowledge the fact that some women have played active roles in terrorist movements. The assassin who in 1991 killed Rajiv Gandhi, the son and successor of India's prime minister Indira Gandhi, was a female suicide bomber who hid her lethal cargo in her sari. She had been a member of a Sri Lankan Tamil separatist group that was angry at Rajiv Gandhi's support of the neighboring Sri Lankan government's attempts to quell their separatist uprising. When the Tupac Amaru movement invaded the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, in 1996, several young rural women were prominent among the cadres, who held the diplomats hostage. A Kurdish rebel suicide bomber in Turkey who killed nine people, including herself, on June 31, 1996, in the town of Tunceli was dressed as a pregnant woman in order to hide the bomb that she was carrying beneath her skirt.

In all of these incidents, however, the groups of which the young terrorist women were a part were motivated by secular political ideologies or ethnic separatism; they were not religious. The Palestinian women who became martyrs as suicide bombers in 2002 were members of the secular branches of the Palestinian independence movement, and not from Hamas, the Islamic branch. Only one Hamas suicide bomber has been a woman, a well-educated sister of a man who was killed in the Israeli military incursion into the city of Jenin. She was acting in revenge for her brother's death. In general women have not played a prominent role in militant religious movements, although some groups—especially those that are less conservative in their religious ideology—have provided an ancillary role for women.

In the Irish nationalist movement, for example, women formed their own paramilitary group, Cumann Na Mbann. Their main role, however, was to carry guns and explosives for the men to use in the military cadres of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.¹ The movement for Sikh separatism in India adopted much the same position. Cynthia Keppley Mahmood reported that when a young woman pleaded with the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force to allow her to become a member, he finally assented but restricted her to support roles—carrying munitions and messages—rather than being involved in “combat actions.”² Mahmood said that the woman waited for the day when she would have the opportunity to be more active. That time came when she broke into the house of a Hindu shopkeeper whom she suspected as having reported her to the police. She held a gun at his head, berating him for turning her in. The shopkeeper denied that he had done so, and was “begging for pardon” and “crying that I was like his daughter,” the young woman said. But she was not dissuaded. “I shot him down with my revolver,” she went on to say, “with my own hands.”³

In reporting this grisly story, the young Sikh woman said that one of her purposes in murdering the Hindu shopkeeper was to spur Sikh men into what she regarded as even greater acts of courage. If they saw that “girls could be so brave,” she reasoned, then Sikh boys “could be even more brave.”⁴ The implication was that the task of killing was ordinarily the work of men—or “boys,” as the young Sikh activists were called—and the role of women was to provide support, to challenge them, and to spur them on.

Her position was essentially that of the great martyr in the Sikh movement, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who addressed his congregations as if the men (especially the young men) were the only ones listening, encouraging them to let their beards grow in the long Sikh fashion and describing their cowardice in the face of government opposition as “emasculatation.” In general, Bhindranwale's attitude was in line with the prevailing values of virtually all cultures of violence based on strong traditional religious ideologies. These have been



postures of “radical patriarchalism,” as Martin Riesebrodt has called it.⁵ The role of men is in public life; the role of women is in the home.

Religious activists often have shown a certain paternalistic respect for women, as long as they have remained in their place. During the 1991–92 Muslim uprising in Algeria, Ali Belhaj, one of the Islamic Front leaders, said that a woman’s primary duty was to “bear good Muslims”; and Sheik Abdelkader Moghni, another Islamic Front leader, complained about women working and taking jobs from men. Women, he said, just “spend their salaries on makeup and dresses, they should return to their homes.”⁶ A businesswoman in Algiers responded by saying she feared that if the Islamic Front succeeded, it would usher in a reign of “pig power.” “They’re all male chauvinist pigs,” she explained, adding, “believe me, we are worried.”⁷ The worst of these fears came true in Afghanistan, where the Taliban party promoted a male-dominant culture that did not tolerate women in public life, even as teachers, doctors, or nurses. Although they claimed that eventually Afghan society would become somewhat more liberal, they stated that society would not be regularized until the fighting was over. Such cases exemplify an assertion of masculinity and a recovery of public virility that is at once sexual, social, and political.

Does this explain why terrorism is primarily a male occupation, and why bombs are most often thrown by guys? I use the term guys in this case because it evokes the camaraderie of young males slightly on the edge of social acceptance. Moreover, it is etymologically rooted in religious activism. The term guy came into use in England in the seventeenth century after Guy Fawkes was tried and executed in 1606 for his role in the Gunpowder Plot. This extraordinary conspiracy planned by radical English Catholics involved thirty-six barrels of gunpowder hidden in a cellar under the House of Lords, set to be ignited on the opening day of Parliament. Intended as a protest against laws they thought would restrict their religious freedom, the explosion would have blown up both British legislative houses and King James I. Thus the religious terrorist, Fawkes, was the original “Guy,” and his name came to be applied to all roguish men who skirted danger.

The religious terrorists of recent years are today’s guys: bands of rogue males at the margins of respect-

ability. The gender specificity of their involvement suggests that some aspect of male sexuality—sexual roles, identity, competence, or control—is a factor in the attitude of these “urban males in their teens.”⁸ Perhaps the easiest aspect to understand is the matter of sexual competence—by which I mean the capacity to have sex, an ability that is limited in traditional societies by moral restrictions and lack of opportunities. There is a certain amount of folklore about men and guns that cannot easily be dismissed—the notion, for instance, that sexual frustration leads to a fascination with phallic-shaped weaponry that explodes in a way that some men are unable to do sexually. As I mentioned earlier, the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement enter into their suicide pacts almost as if it were a marriage covenant. They expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking. One young man who had committed himself to becoming a suicide bomber said that “when I exploded” and became “God’s holy martyr,” he was promised a place for himself and his family in paradise, seventy-two virgins, and a cash settlement for his family equivalent to six thousand dollars.⁹ It was the virgins that seemed to interest the young man the most.

Sexual power for many men involves not only sexual competence—the ability to have sex—but also sexual control. This means knowing when not to have sex, and putting sex in its place. Their aversion to what appear to be sexual aberrations—including misplaced gender roles, such as women assuming dominant positions in the public arena—are examples of sex out of control. To many men these phenomena also exemplify a wider form of social disorder: they are illustrations of the encroaching power of evil, demonstrations of the pervasiveness of the lack of moral values, and examples of how social definitions have become skewed. In *The Turner Diaries*, for instance, William Pierce spoke of what he called “Women’s lib” as being “a form of mass psychosis . . . promoted and encouraged by the System as a means of dividing our race against itself.”¹⁰

This concern with sexual roles elevates the issue beyond one of simple sexual competence or control on a personal level. For Pierce, sex is a social problem: roles and conduct out of place in what he regards as a society in moral decline. Moreover, it is a public pro-



blem that leads in some cases to hostility. It is anger against sex out of place that is often evident in the targets of violence, such as abortion clinics and gay bars. At other times the violence itself has had sexual overtones, as in India and Algeria, where the rape of women has been employed as part of a terrorist act, or in Ireland, where torture of enemies has involved mutilation of the men's genitals—literally, in some cases, emasculating them.

What is the connection between these forms of violence, this macho religiosity, and these yearnings for political power? The antipathy toward modern women—the notion of female sexual roles out of place—is one clue. The hatred of homosexuality is another. It is true that the disdain of homosexuality has been a theme of conservative religion for centuries and was one of the criticisms that the religious opponents of the Enlightenment leveled against the values of secular morality in eighteenth-century France.¹¹ But it has returned with a peculiar stridency in contemporary religious cultures of violence, where the fear of homosexuality—homophobia—has been a prominent theme.

Virtually all radical religious movements of the final decades of the twentieth century have had a homophobic twist. In 1999 a gay couple was killed in northern California and gay bars were attacked allegedly by Christian Identity activists. Gays were included among the “mudpeople” that Benjamin Smith hoped to destroy in his 1999 Illinois rampage, and The Turner Diaries described homosexuality as a kind of aberration that “healthy males” would not consider.¹² Some have gone so far as to misquote the Bible in prescribing “the penaltys [sic] for race-mixing, homo-sexuality [sic], and usury” as “death.”¹³ The gay subculture of Tehran was one of the facets of modern Iranian life that angered Ayatollah Khomeini, and hundreds associated with it perished following the Islamic revolution in Iran. The acceptance of homosexuality in secular Israeli society has dismayed right-wing Jewish activists, who offered the rumors of Yasir Arafat's alleged penchant for boys as evidence of the moral corruption of Palestine's leadership.¹⁴

In Belfast, one of Ian Paisley's main criticisms of liberal Protestantism is its acceptance of gays. “Lesbianism, homosexuality held up as taught in the Bible and to be practiced by Christian people,” he thundered

in one of his sermons, “think of it!”¹⁵ Along the same lines, one of Paisley's complaints about Catholic clergy is that they never marry, a matter of some suspicion to the arch-heterosexual Paisley. Regarding salvation, for instance, he assured his parishioners that the Protestant method was much more efficacious than the Catholic, in large part because of the morally suspect nature of the clergy. “You do not need to kneel at a confessional box,” Paisley told them, “before a bachelor priest who has more sins than you have and yet pretends to forgive you.”¹⁶

Kerry Noble said that his group, the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, regards American cities to be like Sodom and Gomorrah largely because they harbor homosexuals.¹⁷ Noble said that one of the turning points in his disaffection with the Christian Identity movement was when he entered a gay church in Kansas City with the intention of igniting a bomb he was carrying in his briefcase, and decided not to do it. After looking around and seeing men embrace other men, watching women kiss other women, and hearing the preacher speak about his male lover, Noble hesitated. He had second thoughts about the loss of life that would have resulted—at least fifty would have been killed—and he also questioned the effectiveness of the bombing. It would not, he reasoned, precipitate the revolution that he had hoped for. It was only later, after he had rejected the ideology and the personal ties to Christian Identity, that he also abandoned his homophobia and saw gays as scapegoats for what he and his group had regarded as society's immoralities.

Rev. Michael Bray told me that the secular government's tolerance for abortion and homosexuality were the two marks of its moral degeneracy. Considering Bray's prejudices, it is interesting to note that when Bray was sent to prison for bombing abortion clinics, he was placed in the same cell with a pedophile convicted of preying on boys. Bray and his cellmate became fast friends, Bray told me, but only after the pedophile repented of his sins. Still, the man acknowledged to Bray that his sexual inclination toward young men persisted. When Bray refused to take part in a prison prayer meeting with an out-of-the-closet gay prisoner who was unrepentant about his sexuality, this led to tensions within the cell. His cellmate became angry and accused Bray of being antigay. Bray tried to assure his cellmate that same-sex attractions were understand-



dable as long as one did not act on those impulses, and as long as one felt remorseful if indeed such acts were committed.¹⁸

Why have such aversions to homosexuality been held so strongly by contemporary religious activists? One answer is a loss of identity: the kind of heterosexual male who is attracted to such movements is precisely the sort who loses power in a society in which women and gays have access to straight males' traditional positions of authority. They see women and gays as competition.

But there is another answer to the question of why radical religious groups are so homophobic: a loss of control. As Kerry Noble said, homosexuals have been scapegoats for a perceived systemic problem in society. When men have perceived their roles as diminished in a socioeconomic system that denies a sense of agency to individuals, either by being incompetent or overly competent—a faceless mechanical bureaucracy—this challenge has led to a defense of traditional roles. Because men have so frequently held the reins of public order as their gendered responsibility in society in the past, they have felt particularly vulnerable when the public world has fallen apart or has seemed beyond control. In this case, they have seen active women and gays not just as competition, but as symptoms of a world gone awry.

This is a deeper fear, and there is not much that men can do about it. If the problem were just one of competition, they could hope to better themselves, and at least some would be able to succeed on an individual basis. If the problem is more systemic, then it is a matter of social disorder or worse: a sinister hand controlling and disrupting the world. This perception has led naturally to the satanization of enemies and to theories of cosmic war. It has also led naturally to a kind of tribal instinct that encourages members of such cultures of violence to band together and fight.

In such a context, then, though same-sex erotic acts are suspect, male bonding makes sense. Like the camaraderie of a football team facing a dangerous enemy in an uncertain struggle, the close community of men creates a primal form of social order. Unlike heterosexual bonding, which leads to private communities—families—the bonding of groups made up of the

same sex, such as nuns and monks and football players, represents a primitive attempt to create a personalized form of public society. Individuals have a direct relationship with authority and a shared sense of responsibility in clearly delineated social roles. All-male radical religious groups, therefore, attempt to create and defend a righteous order in the face of massive social disorder.

These forms of marginal, male-bonding, anti-institutional, semipolitical movements are not idiosyncratic to the contemporary era. There have been occasions in past centuries when noninstitutional men's associations have spun off from mainstream religious traditions, often with violence on their agenda. The assassins of medieval Islam are one example. The murderous, goddess-worshipping thugs of India—from which we get the English word thug—are another. In Christianity we have had the "guys" of Guy Fawkes's seventeenth-century Catholic terrorists and before them the Crusaders—blessed by Church officials, at least at the outset of their ventures. The Freemasons of the eighteenth century are a Protestant example of men springing from the domesticity of Church religion and founding their own secret order. Though not known for its violence, the organization has skirted the edges of institutional Christianity. So the precedent of somewhat marginal male movements has been set within religious history. But the proliferation of noninstitutional male paramilitary orders, such as the Christian militia, is a relatively recent phenomenon. What is interesting is how intense the internal cohesion of the groups has been.

The Turner Diaries describes an initiation into just such an intimate male circle: the elite of the Order, as it is described in the novel. As he entered the initiation rites, the lead character observed a torchlight flickering over "the coarse, gray robes of the motionless throng" and thought to himself that these men were "the best my race has produced in this generation." They were truly men with whom he wished to bond. "These were no soft-bellied, conservative businessmen assembled for some Masonic mumbo-jumbo," the character affirmed to himself, and they were "no pious, frightened churchgoers whining for the guidance or protection of an anthropomorphic deity." They were "real men, White men, men who were now one with me in spirit and consciousness as well as in blood."¹⁹



As this romantic rhetoric from Pierce's novel suggests, such close male bonding could have a homoerotic element—perhaps paradoxically so, considering the aversion that most men in right-wing religious groups have to sex out of place, including publicly identified homosexual roles. Yet same-sex intimacy has been a strong feature of many right-wing movements. The residents of Richard Butler's Aryan Nations compound in Idaho, for instance, have virtually all been young unmarried men.²⁰ Even married male adherents of Christian Identity have found in their religious and political groupings a certain male bond. The friendship between Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, for example, was so tight and time-consuming that Nichols's wife became jealous.

Young men who volunteered for suicide bombing missions sponsored by the Hamas movement usually worked in pairs and were sent out on missions accompanied by ritual elements often associated with marriage. On one of the videotapes depicting Hamas volunteers for suicide bombings, a young man no more than eighteen years old, wearing stylish dark glasses and a camouflage military cap, tells about his friend, who was sent on a suicide mission from which he never returned: "My brother Hatim, we were friends for the sake of God." The night before he left, the young man said emotionally, "he brequeathed me this gift." It was a dagger. The purpose was "to cut off the head of a collaborator or a Jew." He added, "and God living I will remain alive, and I will be able to fulfill the vow."²¹

The pattern of male bonding in radical religious groups was also found in the movement of Sikh activism that uprooted India's Punjab in the 1980s. Being part of the Sikh movement was to join in a "bond of love," one young militant told Cynthia Keppley Mahmood.²² The portraits of Sukha and Jinda, the Sikh assassins of General Vaidya, that many militants kept on their walls portrayed what Mahmood called "comradely love." With their arms around each other's shoulders, they exemplified the "tight bond of solidarity among comrades-in-arms" that she said accounted for much of the courageous behavior of Sikh militants in the field and the cycles of revenge killing that quickly escalated in the Punjab. In confronting death, Sukha and Jinda were said to have stated in their farewell address that they imagined the hangman's rope "as the embrace of a lover," and they "longed for death as for the marital

bed." Their own "dripping blood" would be the "outcome of this union," and they hoped it would "fertilize the fields of Khalistan."²³ Friendships such as that of Sukha and Jinda are common in societies where extra-marital male-female relationships are not allowed, and relationships within one's own sex can develop to considerable intensities. The Hindi and Punjabi languages have terms for such buddies who are more than just friends: they are *yar*, "intimate friends," or *yaro-ki yar*, "the best of friends."

Friendship may also have played a role in the dramatic events in 1984 that led to the death of the leader of the Sikh movement, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Bhindranwale had befriended his young lieutenant, Surinder Singh Sodhi, whom the Sikh leader described as "my brother."²⁴ Journalists considered him Bhindranwale's "right hand man," "personal bodyguard," and "key hit-man."²⁵ It was the murder of Sodhi on April 17, 1984, that exacerbated the internal struggles between Bhindranwale's followers and the Akali Party forces linked with Gurcharan Singh and Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, both sequestered in the Sikhs' main shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Bhindranwale accused Gurcharan Singh of having plotted Sodhi's murder, and claimed that the death of his young comrade was like "chopping my right hand."²⁶ Bhindranwale spent the week following the youth's murder confined to his quarters. Within days Sodhi's killer and several members of the Akali camp were killed in reprisal. As tensions mounted between the two factions, the Indian army invaded the Golden Temple on June 5 in what became known as Operation Blue Star. In the exchange of fire, Bhindranwale's forces killed the Akali leader, Gurcharan Singh, and Bhindranwale himself was killed. After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated later that year, her son and successor, Rajiv, signed a peace accord with Longowal, who was himself soon thereafter assassinated, thus completing the spiral of violence that began with the killing of Bhindranwale's friend, Sodhi, in 1984.

The theme of male bonding was also found in the Hindu nationalist movement, the RSS, composed of celibate men who boasted of their manhood and took inordinate interest in providing political and religious training to boys and young men in Boy Scout-type outings. Yet when an American scholar published a study of one of the RSS's spiritual heroes, Ramakrishna, re-



vealing the homosexual aspects of his mysticism, the clamor of protest in India was enormous, especially among right-wing supporters of the RSS and the political party they have spawned, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).²⁷

In the hostile Indian response to Jeffrey Kripal's book about Ramakrishna, it was not so much the suggestion of homosexual attraction that was seen as offensive but the modern Western role of the homosexual. The Indian critics found it inconceivable that a spiritual hero such as Ramakrishna could be capable of such a thing. In an e-mail rejoinder to Kripal on an Internet listserv that circulated among American scholars of South Asian religion, Narasingha Sil, a professor of Indian origin, assailed Kripal for making it appear as if Ramakrishna's homosexual tendencies—his "diseased and disturbed mental proclivities"—were "normal or natural." Sil was clearly upset that the guru was put in the same category as those Indian lads "cavorting up and down the streets of the elite quarters of Calcutta or Mumbai, sporting nose rings or earrings." Although the professor acknowledged in India a certain "fondness for young boys on the part of some adult men," it was primarily "a pathetic option for aged impotent males."²⁸

Another scholar, Sarah Lee Caldwell, writing in the same listserv, ruminated over what she described as "deep connections between male sexual prowess, virility, and Hindu nationalist violence."²⁹ In her thinking, the uproar in India over Kripal's suggestion of Ramakrishna's homosexuality was a defensive "hyper-masculine" response that had "roots in the colonial period." It was not just that Ramakrishna had a fondness for boys: the idea that he rejected playing the heterosexual male role and that his disciple, Vivekananda, may have played a passive role in satisfying his guru's sexual desires was, to many Hindu nationalists, "deeply threatening."³⁰ According to Caldwell, the notion that a man would willingly play the woman's role of receiver in a sexual act raised specters of the "feminine" male of India. As several other writers on India have observed, the British view of Indian males as effeminate was part of what has been described as "colonial discourse."³¹

India's nationalist leaders from Gandhi to current members of the BJP have felt obligated to reassert the manliness and potency of India's leadership. As

scholars such as Ashis Nandy have demonstrated, the rhetoric of the British colonial period that referred to Indians in effeminate terms had a deep and enduring impact on India's nationalist movement, an impact that continues to the present day.³² When the BJP came to power and shocked the world by conducting a series of nuclear tests on May 11, 1998, this demonstration of power was overwhelmingly approved within India. As one Indian scholar observed, the BJP's display of power showed the "hyper-masculinity" inherent in the Hindu nationalism movement represented by such Hindu chauvinists as Balasaheb K. Thackeray, leader of the Shiv Sena party, who responded to the nuclear tests with the comment that they proved that Indians were "not eunuchs."³³ In testing the bomb, India's BJP leaders were not only asserting their national power but also rejecting the colonial dominance of the West and its accompanying sense of emasculation.

Although supporters of the Christian militia in the United States have not had the Indians' experience of being a colonized people, their attitudes toward modern liberal government is similar to those of neoconservative Hindu nationalists. Both would agree with the characterization offered by William Pierce that liberal government expects an obedience that is "feminine" and "infantile."³⁴ These are fears not only of sexual impotence but of government's role in the process of emasculation. Men who harbor such fears protect themselves, therefore, not only by setting up veiled defenses against the threats of powerful women and unmanly men, but also by attempting to reassert control in a world that they feel has gone morally and politically askew.

In Israel, the Jewish activist Avigdor Eskin, who accused Yasir Arafat of having a sexual penchant for boys, meant this as not so much a character assault as a political criticism. Eskin offered the example of Arafat's alleged bisexuality to show that the Palestinian leader could not even control his own passions, much less the destiny of a geographical region that Eskin regarded as sacred.³⁵ Eskin, a somewhat effete musician and philosopher, might have gained encouragement in his attitudes from the American religious right, for whom antihomosexuality is something of a virtue, and with whom Eskin had frequent contact. Raised in Russia, Eskin for a time traveled through the United States appearing on the television programs of



evangelists such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell as a spokesperson against the Soviet oppression of the Russian Jewish community. Eventually emigrating to Israel, he became politically active among the Russian Israeli community and was selected in 1998 by Russian immigrants as the fourth most well-known person in the country. When I visited him in March 1998, he was deeply involved in anti-Arab political activism and was under detention for charges of planning to toss a pig's head into the quarters of the Muslim shrine the Dome of the Rock, charges he denied. Whether or not the charges were true, however, his comments confirmed that Eskin's main social concern was not homosexuality but politics and the restoration of what he regarded as righteous biblical order.

The point I have been making is that the homophobic male-dominant language of right-wing religious movements indicates not only a crisis of sexuality but a clash of world views, not just a moral or psychological problem but a political and religious one. It is political in that it relates to the crisis of confidence in public institutions that is characteristic of postmodern societies in the post-Cold War world. It is religious in that it is linked with a perception of the loss of spiritual bearings that a more certain public order provided.

When the lead character in *The Turner Diaries* saw on television the horrific scenes of mangled bodies being carried from the federal building he had just demolished with a truckload of explosive fertilizer and fuel oil, he could still confirm that he was "completely convinced" that what he had done was necessary to save America from its leaders—these "feminine," "infantile" men "who did not have the moral toughness, the spiritual strength" to lead America and give it and its citizens a moral and spiritual purpose. From his point of view, his wretched act was redemptive.

Trivializing the effect of their violence, this character and his real-life counterparts Timothy McVeigh, Mahmud Abouhalima, and many other calculating but desperate men have tried to restore what they perceive to be the necessary social conditions for their sexual and spiritual wholeness. Their rhetoric of manhood has been a cry to reclaim their lost selves and their fragile world.

What they have in common, these movements of cowboy monks, is that they consist of anti-institutional, religio-nationalist, racist, sexist, male-bonding, bomb-throwing young guys. Their marginality in the modern world is experienced as a kind of sexual despair that leads to violent acts of symbolic empowerment. It could almost be seen as poignant, if it were not so terribly dangerous.



Endnotes

1. Martin Dillon, *God and the Gun: The Church and Irish Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 138, 143–57.
2. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation*, 215.
3. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation*, 218.
4. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation*, 218.
5. Martin Riesebrodt, *Pious Passion: The Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 176. See also the essays in John Stratton Hawley, ed., *Fundamentalism and Gender* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
6. Kim Murphy, "Algerian Election to Test Strength of Radical Islam," *Los Angeles Times*, December 26, 1991, 19.
7. Kim Murphy, "Islamic Party Wins Power in Algeria," *Los Angeles Times*, December 28, 1991, A1.
8. Sivan, "Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking over Governments," 2.
9. Rashid Sakher, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber, interviewed by Dan Setton in the documentary film *Shaheed*; the interview was transcribed and published as "A Terrorist Moves the Goalposts," *Harper's*, August 1997, 19–22.
10. Andrew Macdonald [William Pierce], *The Turner Diaries* (Arlington, VA: National Vanguard Alliance Books, 1978), 45.
11. Darrin McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: Anti-Philosophes in Eighteenth Century France* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). For the history of varying Christian attitudes toward homosexuality, see John Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
12. Macdonald [Pierce], *Turner Diaries*, 45.
13. David Lane, "Race, Reason, Religion," unpublished manuscript, 1984, cited in James Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), 86.
14. Interview with Avigdor Eskin, writer and activist for right-wing Jewish causes, Jerusalem, March 3, 1998.
15. Ian Paisley, "Swearing Allegiance to King Jesus," sermon of March 24, 1991, Belfast; reprinted in Ian Paisley, *Sermons on Special Occasions* (Belfast: Ambassador Productions, 1996), 124.
16. Paisley, "Swearing Allegiance to King Jesus," 120.
17. Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 216.
18. Interviews with Michael Bray, pastor, Reformation Lutheran Church, Bowie, Maryland, April 25, 1996, and March 20, 1998.
19. Macdonald [Pierce], *Turner Diaries*, 203. Italics in the original.
20. Murphy, "Last Stand of an Aging Aryan," A15.
21. Hamas videotape from the collection of Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg.
22. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation*, 200.
23. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation*, 201.
24. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, quoted in Shekhar Gupta, "Temple Intrigue," *India Today*, May 15, 1984, 56–57.
25. Gupta, "Temple Intrigue," 56–57. Sodhi was accused of the murders of H. S. Manchanda in Delhi and Harbans Lal Khanna in Amritsar, and of various robberies.
26. Bhindranwale, quoted in Gupta, "Temple Intrigue," 56. Sodhi had been shot as he sat at a tea stall outside the temple compound by a lower-caste woman, Baljit Kaur, who worked for Surinder Singh, alias Chhinda. Sodhi had allegedly previously collaborated in a series of crimes with Chhinda, but the two had a falling out. Bhindranwale claimed that Chhinda and Baljit Kaur were hired as a hit team by the Akali leaders. Both were tortured and murdered hours after Sodhi's killing, as was the owner of the tea stall where Sodhi was shot.
27. Jeffrey J. Kripal, *Kali's Child: The Mystical and the Erotic in the Life and Teachings of Ramakrishna* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
28. Narasingha Sil, "Re: Vahbharambhe Laghurkriya," *Religion in South Asia*, an Internet listserv, May 10, 1998; quoted with the permission of Prof. Sil.
29. Sarah Lee Caldwell, "Re: Kali's Child—Reply," *Religion in South Asia*, an Internet listserv, May 5, 1998; quoted with the permission of Prof. Caldwell.
30. See Kripal, *Kali's Child*, 301–2.
31. See Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Joseph Alter, *The Wrestler's Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Indira Chowdhury, *Frail Hero and Virile History: Gender and the Politics of Culture in Colonial Bengal* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
32. Nandy, *Intimate Enemy*.
33. Vinay Lal, "The Cultural Politics of Indian Nuclearism," op-ed article, *Los Angeles Times*, May 18, 1998.
34. Macdonald [Pierce], *Turner Diaries*, 42.
35. Interview with Eskin, March 3, 1998.