Rarely have German elections been covered so intensely both nationally and internationally and for good reason. International media outlets have been pondering the end of the era Merkel and what might follow. German voters have been in the thralls of polls, trends, and TV-Trielle (three-way duels on TV) which discussed issues such as the Covid-19 crisis, migration, digitalization, corruption, and, prime among them, the climate crisis in three national TV debates.

The election results with the SPD winning by a narrow margin have led to negotiations for a three-party government coalition between the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, and the Freie Demokratische Partei, the so-called Ampel-Koalition/traffic light coalition (named after the parties’ colors). The argument that the era of Volksparteien/mass parties may well be over has received much attention in the broader public and the question of what will become of German parliamentary democracy has raised the specter of an ever more fractious political landscape.

To help us understand the election and its outcomes, two distinguished political scientists and Berlin Program Alumni will share their analyses. In a brief survey, David Patton will provide and explain election results. Carol Hager will examine the role of the salient election topic, climate change, in the Bundestagswahl 2021.
I had the good fortune to be part of a 2021 German federal election observation trip in Berlin in September that was organized by the International Association for the Study of German Politics with support from the DAAD. This year’s election was the most exciting in many years and took place under unusual circumstances. For the first time since 1949, an incumbent chancellor was not running again and as a result there was no clear “chancellor bonus.” Without Angela Merkel, who long ago had made clear she did not intend to go off as a “half-dead wreck,” where would the many “Merkel-voters” turn? These are voters who had backed the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) due to the pragmatic and competent chancellor. Would they opt for the CDU/CSU candidate Armin Laschet, the Greens with Annalena Baerbock atop the ticket, or the Social Democratic Party’s Olaf Scholz?

Climate change has been a major concern in Germany for decades. Aided by grassroots environmental groups and several widely publicized scientific reports, the issue reached the West German political agenda in the mid-1980s and stayed there. By the end of that decade, all of the major political parties cited climate as one of their priorities. Concern over climate change is manifested currently in the remarkable durability of public support for the German energy transition (Energiewende). Although support has slipped from its high-water mark of close to 95%, it is still comparatively very high. In a December 2020 survey, for example, 86% of respondents found strengthening and building out renewable energies to be “very or extraordinarily important” (65%) or “important” (21%). The Covid-19 pandemic did not detract from the salience of the climate issue.

**The GroKo record on climate**

The outgoing CDU/CSU-SPD-led government claimed much of the credit for Germany’s strong stand on climate issues. Angela Merkel has a long record of climate action. As Environment Minister under Helmut Kohl, she led the first UN Climate Conference (COP) in Berlin in 1995. Her international advocacy earned her the title of “climate chancellor” during her first term in office. As leader of the Grand Coalition government 2005–2009, she was...
lost support as climate change and immigration/integration fell out of the public eye. Although both the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and AfD had positioned themselves as critics of the government pandemic response, I spotted only AfD posters that highlighted this issue, blaring: “Put the Government in Lockdown!” The AfD’s campaign slogan, “Germany, but normal,” implied a return to pre-Covid conditions. A new party, *die Basis*, backed grassroots protest during the pandemic and on its posters urged voters to: “Stop the Corona Madness.” The pandemic did not feature prominently in the televised chancellor candidate debates and, although voters judged the CDU/CSU as the most capable on this issue, it did not weigh heavily in their decision. Olaf Scholz, who as federal finance minister had loosened purse strings, was closely associated with the government’s largely successful crisis management. The FDP’s criticism of Corona policies might help explain why it performed so well among young voters, coming close to what the Greens received.

The pandemic did have important indirect effects. It delayed the Greens’ and the CDU/CSU’s selection of chancellor candidates and their ability to organize their campaigns. Both Laschet and Baerbock struggled to find their stride unlike Scholz who had been nominated well before the pandemic. The pandemic also led to a record number of absentee ballots cast, rising to about 47% of the total. These votes in the vault may have helped the SPD withstand a political force, the rising political salience of climate change, and surging support for the Greens in the 2018 Bavarian and Hessian state elections provided impetus for the 2019 Climate Action Law. The need for a Covid-19 recovery package gave an opportunity to outline a “green recovery” that prioritizes decarbonization of the transport sector. When the high court ruled in April 2021 that the Climate Action Law failed to protect future generations, the Merkel government has been criticized for its failure to reconcile support for German industry—especially the automobile and lignite coal industries—with domestic greenhouse gas reduction targets. Her government’s support of coal and natural gas as bridge fuels in the face of the 2022 shutdown of domestic nuclear power has exacerbated tensions with renewable energy advocates and, along with lagging efforts to decarbonize the housing and transport sectors, has made Germany’s climate goals difficult to attain.

Merkel has been able to leverage recent developments to regain stalled domestic momentum on climate issues. The emergence of Fridays for Future as a political force, the rising political salience of climate change, and surging support for the Greens in the 2018 Bavarian and Hessian state elections provided impetus for the 2019 Climate Action Law. The need for a Covid-19 recovery package gave an opportunity to outline a “green recovery” that prioritizes decarbonization of the transport sector. When the high court ruled in April 2021 that the Climate Action Law failed to protect future generations, the Merkel government has been criticized for its failure to reconcile support for German industry—especially the automobile and lignite coal industries—with domestic greenhouse gas reduction targets. Her government’s support of coal and natural gas as bridge fuels in the face of the 2022 shutdown of domestic nuclear power has exacerbated tensions with renewable energy advocates and, along with lagging efforts to decarbonize the housing and transport sectors, has made Germany’s climate goals difficult to attain.

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last-minute CDU-CSU mini-surge. On the whole, I found there to be somewhat less street campaigning and fewer posters than in past campaigns, probably due to the pandemic.

Prior to the onset of Covid-19, when Germans rated climate change as the most important policy problem facing the country, the Greens polled in the low-mid 20s, not far behind the CDU/CSU. They fell back in 2020, only to rise again as the pandemic receded in spring 2021. In July 2021, catastrophic flooding brought death and destruction to Rhineland-Palatinate and North Rhine-Westphalia. Would the floods upend the election campaign? Back in August 2002, Elbe flooding had bolstered Gerhard Schröder’s reputation as a competent crisis manager and foregrounded the issue of climate change. However, despite the July 2021 floods and a renewed focus on the environment, the Greens did not surge in the polls. In 2002, a lasting media image was of Chancellor Schröder in rubber boots visiting the flooded city of Grimma. Now it was of Armin Laschet, joking and laughing as Federal President Steinmeier delivered a somber speech to a hard-hit region. This picture proved especially damaging to Laschet and ushered in lower approval ratings from which he never recovered.

government responded immediately by accelerating Germany’s target date for achieving carbon neutrality to 2045, putting the country back in a leadership position on climate and creating a target that would differentiate the political parties over the course of the summer campaign.

Nevertheless, a feeling of crisis fatigue seemed to accompany the chancellor’s final months in office, and this feeling encompassed, among others, the climate issue. Angela Merkel herself seemed dissatisfied with her climate record. In her last national press conference in July, while claiming credit for major accomplishments, she also recognized that Germany had not done enough on her watch to avert a global climate catastrophe.²

2 Climate platforms of the major political parties

2021 was the first federal parliamentary election in which all of the major parties included climate as an important part of their platforms and, with the exception of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), competed for the mantle of climate leadership. For its part, the AfD campaigned on an explicitly pro-fossil
It reinforced an impression of Armin Laschet as a jovial lightweight from the Rhineland (even though he was minister president of Germany’s largest region), better suited to being master of ceremony at carnival than federal chancellor. During the “hot phase” of the campaign, the CDU put up posters with a serious looking Laschet, not even really smiling, probably an attempt by campaign managers to avoid any association with what had happened during the Steinmeier speech. In contrast, Olaf Scholz had come across as professional and competent and as finance minister had been in a position to allocate much needed funds. With the benefit of hindsight, the July floods now seem something akin to the “October surprise” before a US presidential election. Scholz managed it much better than did Laschet.

During the campaign, the media complained about the lack of policy substance, but did their part to cover the horse race between the three chancellor candidates. Olaf Scholz and the SPD moved ahead of the CDU/CSU and Greens in August. As a member of our election trip group later quipped, the SPD may not have had the right candidate, but it certainly had the right opponents. Unlike Laschet and Baerbock, Scholz avoided major miscues and ran a steady race. He maintained a low-key demeanor, conveying...
competence over charisma. Some compared him with another rather technocratic Social Democrat from Hamburg, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who famously had said that “whoever has visions should go to the doctor.” Like Schmidt, Scholz was more popular than his party. The SPD united behind its candidate, providing a stark and, for many voters, welcome contrast to the divided CDU/CSU camp. As our election group learned, SPD party headquarters had taken full advantage of Scholz’s early nomination to avoid some of the pitfalls that had beset Martin Schulz, the party’s candidate in 2017.

On September 25, the Saturday before the election, two colleagues and I had the chance to campaign with the SPD politicians Cansel Kiziltepe (member of the Bundestag) and Sevim Aydin (member of the Berlin House of Deputies) at Kottbusser Tor in Kreuzberg. Ms. Kiziltepe faced a difficult task since this was the one district in Germany that the Greens had won outright in 2017. (This changed dramatically the following day when the Greens captured a plurality in 16 districts.) The SPD candidates, who elicited friendly responses from those who passed by, distributed party literature and addressed voter concerns, a reminder that in Germany retail politics still happens more in the town square than door-to-door, as is common in the United States.

To become CDU/CSU chancellor candidate, Armin Laschet had overcome a spirited challenge from the CSU leader Markus Söder, thanks to Laschet’s standing among CDU functionaries. Ominously for Laschet, most party members and voters had preferred Söder who continued to needle the CDU chair. In contrast to Scholz, Laschet was less popular than his party and more of an anchor than a life preserver. His attacks late in the campaign came across as desperate rather than authentic.

Riding high in polls, the Greens put forth their own chancellor candidate for the first time. The party opted for co-leader Annalena Baerbock. After the April announcement, the Greens soared in the opinion polls and even topped the CDU/CSU in some surveys. Yet it proved to be more of a gush than a wave. Critical stressed new technologies and innovation in achieving these goals, while the SPD stressed the importance of local participation in the energy transition. For its part, the FDP avoided the contest over dates for achieving climate neutrality and instead advocated for innovation through market activity rather than regulation. Perhaps most surprisingly, the Left Party focused heavily on linking climate and social policy in its election platform. By committing to a target date of 2035 for achieving carbon neutrality, it even came in ahead of the Greens, who subsequently had to match that target date in their own campaigning. The Greens also rejected the 2038 exit from coal, advocating for a target date of 2030.

There were three televised debates among the top-tier candidates for chancellor. All three featured questions on climate. It was certainly the highest visibility this issue has received in a Bundestag campaign, and it provided a contrast to the 2017 election campaign.

**Summer 2021: The climate issue gets real**

In July 2021, parts of Rhineland-Palatinate and North Rhine-Westphalia were inundated by massive flooding. Panicked residents trapped in their homes shared harrowing videos on social media. The world looked on in horror as the floods seemed to swallow entire villages. Shortly thereafter, wildfires ravaged drought-stricken southern Europe and the western United States. Images of dazed-looking residents staring back at their burning villages as they were evacuated by ferry from the Greek island of Evia were difficult to forget. There was very little dispute in the European press that these catastrophes were the result of human-caused climate change. As one Greek farmer aptly put it: “We should consider what legacy we are handing down to our children. This was passed down to us. What will we give? Scorched earth? How will they live?”

Summer 2021 also saw a renewed surge in youth activism on the climate issue. Fridays for Future had achieved resonance in Germany in the preceding years. On August 30, a group of six young adults calling themselves the “last generation” set up camp
news about Baerbock—that she had not reported income, that she had inflated her CV, and that her campaign book did not cite some of its sources—took a toll on her popularity and the Greens’ chances. The party struggled to make the campaign about its policies rather than its candidate. In part, as we learned on the trip, this was because the Greens had the funding and staffing levels of a small party, but were nonetheless challenging, with their own chancellor candidate, the bigger, better funded, more experienced CDU/CSU and SPD. By August, it had become clear that the Greens would not be placing the next chancellor, nor even finishing second.

The smaller parties centered their campaigns on party leaders to varying degrees. The Free Democratic Party foregrounded its photogenic chairperson Christian Lindner. In a small fold-up brochure handed to me on the Schloßstraße in Steglitz, his picture appeared no fewer than nine times. He was prominently featured near the Reichstag building in Berlin and began a hunger strike. They demanded a public discussion with all the chancellor candidates on the creation of a citizen advisory council for climate protection measures. None of the candidates, they said, had responded adequately to the climate crisis, and they would continue their strike until this changed. Ultimately, several of the strikers would be taken to the hospital, and the discussions they demanded would not be granted in advance of the vote. Robert Habeck met with them a few days before the vote, but he was unable to convince them to end their strike. On September 16, Union candidate Armin Laschet’s appearance in Bremen was interrupted by climate protesters. On the Friday before the election, September 24, Fridays for Future held a global climate strike that included actions in more than 400 German cities and towns, including a large demonstration in Berlin featuring prominent activists Greta Thunberg and Luise Neubauer.
on the FDP’s campaign posters, with such slogans as “Never was there more to do.” In contrast, the AfD and the Left Party had lead candidates with low favorability ratings and limited name recognition. At the final rally of the Left Party on Alexanderplatz on Friday afternoon, I heard Gregor Gysi deliver a funny and effective speech. However, unlike twelve years ago when I saw Gysi and the Left Party co-chair Oskar Lafontaine excite a large, enthusiastic crowd, this time Gysi, who no longer holds a position of party leadership, addressed a much smaller and more subdued gathering. Without well-known lead candidates, the Left Party struggled in 2021 to gain notice in a campaign that centered on personalities. I left the rally with the sense that the party was in trouble. Gysi surely knew it too when he implored those in attendance to vote for the Left Party district candidates since by winning three districts the party would not have to clear the five-percent threshold. This is exactly what saved *die Linke* after it received a vote share of 4.9%, but returned to the Bundestag thanks to winning two districts in Berlin and one in Leipzig.

This was an election that would bring forth a novel governing coalition. In the last 64 years, the CDU/CSU and SPD had either governed together in grand coalition or with a small third party. At the start of 2021 the Christian Democrats, polling around 37%, appeared certain to finish first, far ahead of the Greens and SPD, making a Union-Green coalition a probable outcome. By late August, after a surging SPD had overtaken the CDU/CSU, either an SPD-FDP-Greens coalition (known as traffic light) or a CDU/CSU-Greens-FDP coalition (known as Jamaica from the black-green-yellow colors of that country’s flag) were most likely. Yet, as Laschet and the CDU/CSU trailed the SPD, they darkly warned of a third coalition, namely an SPD-Left Party-Greens alliance (or Red-Red-Green). This was a long shot given that Scholz represented the SPD’s centrist wing, and that the Left Party called for the replacement of NATO with a new collective security arrangement that included Russia. When the ballots were counted, Red-Red-Green, never a likely outcome, lacked a Bundestag majority, thereby leaving traffic light and Jamaica as remaining options.

The cascading disasters and high-visibility activism had an effect on the salience of climate change as a campaign issue. Climate began as the second-most cited issue of the campaign in polls, behind pensions and the social system and ahead of the economy and jobs. In June 2021, 44% cited it as one of the top three issues. It peaked in July at 50% and declined during the last month of the campaign to just over 46%, but it remained the second most cited issue throughout the campaign season.4

The fact that the climate issue failed to take a huge jump at the end of the summer does not mean that the public stopped caring. Manfred Fischedick, scientific managing director of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy and a lead author of the most recent IPCC assessment report, explains that the fact that climate is not constantly front and center has to do with its change in status from a niche issue to a mainstream one. Every major political party except the AfD includes ambitious climate goals in its platform. Fischedick says, “The differences are in the question of how these goals are to be achieved—which measures will be used, which instruments. And this is a very technical question for an election campaign.”5 Getting into the weeds on this issue, in other words, does not make good headline politics.

Still, on the last Friday before the vote, the day of nationwide climate demonstrations, the two Volksparteien both tried to out-green the Greens on climate issues. SPD candidate Scholz criticized the Green-led state government in Baden-Württemberg for failing to build out renewable energy more quickly. CDU/CSU candidate Laschet said it has been clear to the Union for a long time that “we in Germany have to show that we’re the fastest, that we’re the best, that we have the best technologies to shift our entire economy to climate neutrality.”6 For her part, Green candidate Baerbock visited the Fridays for Future demonstration in Cologne, stating that there should be no doubt that this election is a “climate election,” that the time for half measures was long past, and that the leadership on this issue belonged to her party.
On election day, I saw none of the problems that reportedly plagued 207 of the 2257 Berlin polling stations. (In fact, the only long line I saw was in front of a popular ice cream shop in the northern village of Lübars.) It turns out that the Berlin marathon, in which three members of our election group successfully competed, may have complicated matters. More significantly, Berliners had six votes to cast, with federal elections (two votes for the Bundestag/lower house of parliament), regional elections (two votes for the Abgeordnetenhaus/state parliament), municipal elections (one vote for the Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen/district assemblies) and a non-binding referendum on nationalizing major housing companies taking place. There were even different ballot boxes. There would have been more problems, but not many voted early. A friend of mine reported that her 90-year old mother was confounded by the many ballots and would have struggled had she not had the opportunity to vote from home at her leisure. Berlin’s Constitutional Court will soon decide whether and in which districts elections have to be repeated.

The Greens were the only party to pick up votes from all of the other parties. They gained the greatest number from the Union (920,000), the AfD (600,000), and the Left Party (480,000). Despite their historically high percentage, they ran a distant third to the SPD and the Union. The Left Party, which had arguably taken the strongest line on climate, sank to 4.9% on the second ballot, which determines the number of representatives a party will have in parliament.

The result raises several important questions with regard to the parties’ stands on climate. First, why

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Activists of the initiative Deutsche Wohnen & Co enteignen collecting signatures for the non-binding referendum in Berlin. They campaigned for the expropriation of major private real-estate companies.
On the evening of the election, I attended an event organized by the Progressive Center and hosted by the regional representation of Rhineland-Palatinate, not coincidentally the Bundesland where the SPD, Greens and FDP run the government. The atmosphere was good, aided by tasty white wines from the Rhine region, and it improved further once it was apparent the SPD had finished first and the chances of a traffic light coalition were favorable. In the background, we heard party leaders thrash out the election results in the so-called Elephant Round.

When the final results came in, the SPD had received more votes than the CDU/CSU for the first time in nearly 20 years and only for the fourth time ever. Led by Olaf Scholz, the party had greatly improved its standing among voters over the age of 60 and among eastern Germans. Yet its vote share of 25.7 %, while impressive when compared to its polling at 15 % just three months prior, paled in contrast to the 38.5 % that the SPD had received as recently as 2002.

The CDU/CSU fell to 24.1 %, its worst federal election result ever. The Christian Democrats lost heavily among older voters and their share of those under the age of 30 declined to just 11 %. The 2021 outcome validated the adage that while elections cannot be won in the much smaller eastern part of the country, they can be lost there. The CDU lost over ten percentage points in the region to finish at 16.8 %, a distant third behind the SPD and the AfD, and far below its western average. Together the SPD and CDU/CSU received less than half of the votes cast nationally—a sign that the once mighty Volksparteien were shadows of their former selves.

The Greens settled for 14.8 %, much lower than what they had envisioned, but still a solid improvement over their last result of 8.9 % and their best showing ever. The FDP registered modest gains to finish at 11.5 %. After the election, AfD leaders bickered publicly about whether their party had performed well or not. On the one hand, it lost over two percentage points and did not benefit from the CDU/CSU’s debacle. On the other hand, it still finished with a
double-digit result (10.3%), even though the issue of migration/integration was largely absent from the public debate and even though the AfD was completely isolated, with no hope of forming the next government. The party had lost vote share disproportionately in the west. In the east, it won sixteen direct seats and finished first in Thuringia and Saxony. The Left Party understood it had suffered an historic defeat, receiving two million fewer votes than in 2017 and only just returning to parliament. Earlier the self-proclaimed voice of the east, the party barely reached the ten-percent mark in the former GDR.

Now that the election is over, negotiations among the parties have begun in earnest. All signs point to a Scholz-led SPD-Greens-FDP coalition as the three parties look for a consensus on taxes, the debt brake, unemployment benefits, and investments to counter climate change.

among voters for whom climate is particularly salient. By the same token, they must continue to develop credible signature positions on the entire spectrum of political issues, some of which may be less popular than their climate positions.

Notes
1 YouGov survey commissioned by Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien, n=1,051; status 12/2020: www.unendlich-viel-energie.de
4 Civey Institute survey, data as of 24 September 2021, cited in www.fes.de/en/german-election
5 Martin Kuebler, “German Election: Is this the climate election, or isn’t it?,” DW, 17 September 2021: www.dw.com/en/german-election-is-this-the-climate-election-or-isnt-it/a-59210865
6 Der Spiegel, Bundestagswahl-Blog: www.spiegel.de/thema/bundestagswahl_2021
Imprint

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